Estimation of an Occupational Choice Model when Occupations are Misclassified by Sullivan, Paul
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Estimation of an Occupational Choice
Model when Occupations are
Misclassified
Paul Sullivan
Bureau of Labor Statistics
October 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9313/
MPRA Paper No. 9313, posted 26. June 2008 02:22 UTC
Estimation of an Occupational Choice Model
when Occupations are Misclassied
Paul Sullivan
Bureau of Labor Statistics
October 2007
Abstract
This paper examines occupational choices using a discrete choice model that
accounts for the fact that self-reported occupation data is measured with error.
Despite evidence from validation studies which suggests that there is a substan-
tial amount of measurement error in self-reported occupations, existing research
has not corrected for classication error when estimating models of occupational
choice. This paper develops a panel data model of occupational choices that
corrects for misclassication in occupational choices and measurement error in
occupation-specic work experience variables. The model is used to estimate
the extent of measurement error in self-reported occupation data and quantify
the bias that results from ignoring measurement error in occupation codes when
studying the determinants of occupational choices and estimating the e¤ects of
occupation-specic human capital on wages. The parameter estimates reveal
that 9% of occupational choices in the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudi-
nal Survey of Youth are misclassied. Ignoring misclassication leads to biases
that a¤ect the conclusions drawn from empirical occupational choice models.
JEL codes: J24, C25, C15
Keywords: Occupational choice, Misclassication, Discrete choice, Simula-
tion methods
1 Introduction
Occupational choices have been the subject of considerable research interest by economists be-
cause of their importance in shaping employment outcomes and wages over the career. Topics
of study range from the analysis of job search and occupational matching (McCall 1990, Neal
1999) to studies of the determinants of wage inequality (Gould 2002) to dynamic human capital
models of occupational choices (Keane and Wolpin 1997). Despite the large amount of research
into occupational choices and evidence from validation studies such as Mellow and Sider (1983)
which suggests that as many as 20% of one-digit occupational choices are misclassied, it is
surprising that existing research has not corrected for classication error in occupations when
estimating models of occupational choice. The existence of classication error in occupations is a
serious concern because in the context of a nonlinear discrete choice occupational choice model,
measurement error in the dependant variable results in biased parameter estimates.
The goal of this paper is to estimate a model of occupational choices that corrects for classi-
cation error in occupation data when direct evidence on the validity of individualsself-reported
occupations is unavailable. The approach taken in this paper is to specify a model of occupational
choices that incorporates a parametric model of occupational misclassication. The parameters
of the occupational choice model and the parameters that describe the extent of misclassication
in occupation data are estimated jointly by simulated maximum likelihood. As is the case in all
structural models, a limitation of this approach is that it requires the researcher to make para-
metric assumptions about objects in the model such as the functional form of the wage equation,
the distribution of random variables that a¤ect occupational choices, and the process by which
occupations are misclassied.
The classication error literature consists of two broadly dened approaches to estimating
parametric models in the presence of classication error.1 One approach uses assumptions about
the measurement error process along with auxiliary information on error rates, which typically
takes the form of validation or re-interview data, to correct for classication error. Examples of
this approach to measurement error are found in work by Abowd and Zellner (1985), Chua and
Fuller (1987), Poterba and Summers (1995), Magnac and Visser (1999), and Chen, Hong, and
Tamer (2005). The second approach to estimating models in the presence of misclassied data
1An alternative approach to dealing with misclassication derives nonparametric bounds under relatively
weak assumptions about misclassication. See, for example, Bollingers (1996) study of mismeasurered binary
independent variables in a linear regression, and Kreider and Peppers (2004A, 2004B) work on misclassication
in disability status.
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corrects for misclassication without relying on auxiliary information by estimating parametric
models of misclassication. Examples of this approach are found in Hausman, Abrevaya, and
Scott-Morton (1998), Dustmann and van Soest (2001), and Li, Trivedi, and Guo (2003).
The occupational choice model developed in this paper combines features of the two existing
approaches to misclassication. Instead of relying on the availability of auxiliary information
that provides direct evidence on misclassied occupational choices, information about misclassi-
cation is derived from observed wages. This approach takes advantage of the fact that observed
wages provide information about true occupational choices because wages vary widely across
occupations. Intuitively, the occupational choices identied by the model as likely to be misclas-
sied are the ones where the observed wage is unlikely to be observed in the reported occupation.
Also, the model developed in this paper uses additional information provided by the fact that
true occupational choices are strongly inuenced by observable variables such as education to
draw inferences about the extent of misclassication in the data.
One methodological contribution of this work is that it develops a method of dealing with the
problems created in panel data models when misclassication in the dependant variable creates
measurement error in the explanatory variables in the model. Misclassication in occupation
codes creates measurement error in lagged occupational choices and occupation specic work
experience variables, so the true values of these variables are unobserved state variables. Ex-
isting research into occupational choices and misclassication in general has not addressed this
problem.2 This work addresses the problem by using simulation methods to approximate the
otherwise intractable integrals over the unobserved state variables that appear in the likelihood
function.3 The simulation algorithm developed in this paper is applicable in a wide range of
settings beyond occupational choice models.
The parameter estimates provide evidence that a substantial fraction of occupational choices
are misclassied in the NLSY data, and suggest that ignoring misclassication leads to bi-
ases that a¤ect the qualitative and quantitative conclusions drawn from estimated occupational
2The only other paper to examine the connection between misclassication in the dependant variable and
meaurement error in explanatory variables is Keane and Sauers (2006) study of female labor supply that examines
misclassication in reported labor force status. Keane and Sauer (2006) estimate their model using the simulation
procedure developed by Keane and Wolpin (2001) to deal with the problem of unobserved state variables in
dynamic models.
3This application of simulation methods adds to a growing literature that uses simulation methods to solve
problems created by missing data and measurement error. For example, Lavy, Palumbo, and Stern (1998)
and Stinebrickner (1999) use simulation methods to solve estimation problems created by missing data, and
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2004) develop a model of college outcomes that uses simulation methods to
correct for measurement error in self-reported study time.
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choice models. Estimates of the transferability of human capital across occupations appear to
be particularly sensitive to the false occupational transitions created by misclassication. The
results also suggest that the extent of misclassication varies widely across occupations, and that
observed wages provide a large amount of information about which occupational choices in the
data are likely to be a¤ected by misclassication. For example, the model predicts that high
wage workers who are observed as professionals are very likely to be correctly classied, but low
wage workers observed as professionals are likely to be misclassied.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and discusses
the possible sources of measurement error in occupation codes. Section 3 presents the model of
occupational choices and misclassication and discusses how the model is estimated. Section
4 presents the parameter estimates, and Section 5 analyzes the patterns in misclassication
predicted by the model using simulated occupational choice data. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) is a panel dataset that contains detailed
information about the employment and educational experiences of a nationally representative
sample of young men and women who were between the ages of 14 and 21 when rst interviewed
in 1979. The employment data contain information about the durations of employment spells
along with the wages, hours, and three-digit 1970 U.S. Census occupation codes for each job.
This analysis uses only white men ages 18 or older from the nationally representative core
sample of the NLSY. The weekly labor force record found in the work history les is aggregated
into a yearly employment record for each individual. First, a primary job is assigned to each
month based on the number of weeks worked in each job reported for the month. An individuals
primary job for each year is dened as the one in which the most months were spent during
that year. The yearly employment record is used to create a running tally of accumulated work
experience in each occupation for each worker. This analysis considers only full time employment,
which is dened as a job where the weekly hours worked are at least 20.
Descriptions of the one-digit occupation classications along with average wages are presented
in Table 1a. The highest paid workers are professional and managerial workers, while the lowest
paid workers are found in the service occupation. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1b.
There are 954 individuals in the estimation sample who contribute a total of 10,573 person-year
observations to the data. On average, each individual contributes approximately 11 observations
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to the data. Appendix A contains further details about the data used to estimate the model,
including the details of how the sample is selected, and a discussion of the representativeness of
the nal sample.
2.1 Measurement Error in Occupation Codes
The NLSY provides the U.S. Census occupation codes for each job. Interviewers question respon-
dents about the occupation of each job held during the year with the following two questions:
What kind of work do you do? That is, what is your occupation? Coders use these descriptions
to classify each job using the three-digit Census occupation coding scheme. Misclassication
of occupation codes may arise from errors made by respondents when describing their job, or
from errors made by coders when interpreting these descriptions. Evidence on the extent of
misclassication is provided by Mellow and Sider (1983), who perform a validation study of oc-
cupation codes using occupation codes found in the CPS matched with employer reports of their
employees occupation. They nd agreement rates for occupation codes of 58% at the narrowly
dened three digit level and 81% at the more broadly dened one digit level. Additional evidence
on measurement error in occupation codes is presented by Mathiowetz (1992). Mathiowetz (1992)
independently creates one and three-digit occupation codes based on occupational descriptions
from employees of a large manufacturing rm and job descriptions found in these workers per-
sonnel les. The agreement rate between these independently coded one-digit occupation codes
is 76%, while the agreement rate for three-digit codes is only 52%. In addition to comparing
the three and one-digit occupation codes produced by independent coding, Mathiowetz (1992)
also conducts a direct comparison of the company record with the employees occupational de-
scription to see if the two sources could be classied as same three-digit occupation. This direct
comparison results in an agreement rate of 87% at the three-digit level.
In general, papers examining occupational choices and the returns to occupation specic work
experience have not dealt with the di¢ cult issues raised by measurement error in occupation codes
even though it is widely believed that occupation codes are quite noisy. Work by Kambourov
and Manovskii (2007) is a notable exception to this trend. They exploit the fact that the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) originally coded occupations using an approach similar to the
NLSY in which occupation coders translated workers verbatim descriptions of their occupation
into an occupation code separately in each survey year. The PSID later released retrospective
occupation data les where occupation coders were instead given access to a workers complete
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sequence of occupational descriptions over his career. Kambourov and Manovskii (2007) show
that occupational mobility is lower in the retrospective les, which is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that coders introduce measurement error into occupation codes when they interpret workers
verbatim job descriptions. However, it is important to note that while this type of retrospective
coding is likely to reduce the number of false occupational transitions found in the data, it does
not provide any additional information about a workers true occupation. Given this limitation
of the PSID data, Kambourov and Manovskii (2007) estimate the returns to occupation specic
work experience, but they are not able to allow the wage equation to vary across occupations,
or to estimate the importance of cross occupation experience e¤ects.
3 Occupational Choice Model with Misclassication
3.1 A Baseline Model of Misclassication
The model of occupational choices developed in this paper builds on previous models of sectoral
and occupational choices such as Heckman and Sedlacek (1985, 1990) and Gould (2002). These
models are all based on the framework of self selection in occupational choices introduced by Roy
(1951). Let V iqt represent the utility that worker i receives from working in occupation q at time
period t. Let N represent the number of people in the sample, let T (i) represent the number
of time periods that person i in the sample, and let Q represent the number of occupations.
Assume that the value of working in each occupation is the following function of the wage and
non-pecuniary utility,
V iqt = wiqt +Hiqt + "iqt; (1)
where wiqt is the log wage of person i in occupation q at time t; Hiqt is the deterministic portion
of the non-pecuniary utility that person i receives from working in occupation q at time t, and
"iqt is an error term that captures variation in the utility ow from working in occupation q
caused by factors that are observed by the worker but unobserved by the econometrician.
The log wage equation is
wiqt = iq + Zitq +
QX
k=1
qkExpikt + eiqt; (2)
where iq is the intercept of the log wage equation for person i in occupation q, Zit is a vector
of explanatory variables, and Expikt is person i s experience at time t in occupation k. This
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specication allows for a full set of cross-occupation experience e¤ects, so the parameter estimates
provide evidence on the transferability of skills across occupations. The nal term, eiqt, represents
a random wage shock. The deterministic portion of the non-pecuniary utility ow equation for
person i is specied as
Hiqt = Xitq +
QX
k=1
qkExpikt +
QX
k=1
qkLastoccikt + iq; (3)
where Xit is a vector of explanatory variables and Lastoccikt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
person i worked in occupation k at time t 1. This variable allows switching occupations to have
a direct impact on non-pecuniary utility, as it would if workers incur non-pecuniary costs when
switching occupations. The nal term, iq; represents person is innate preference for working
in occupation q. In general, sectoral choice models of this type are identied even if the same
explanatory variables appear in both the wage equation and the non-pecuniary utility ow equa-
tion. However, it is normally considered desirable to include a variable that impacts occupational
choices but does not directly impact wages. In this application lagged occupational choice dum-
mies and high school and college diploma dummies are included in the non-pecuniary equation
but excluded from the wage equation. The exclusion of the lagged occupational choice dummies
from the wage equation assumes that individuals incur psychic mobility costs when switching
occupations, but there is no direct monetary switching cost. However, because occupation spe-
cic experience e¤ects vary across occupations, when an individual switches occupations his
accumulated skills may be valued less highly in his new occupation.4
Let Oit represent the occupational choice observed in the data for person i at time t. This
variable is an integer that takes a value ranging from 1 to Q. A persons true occupational choice
may di¤er from the one observed in the data if classication error exists. Let bOit represent the
true occupational choice, which is simply the occupation that yields the highest utility,
bOit = q if V iqt = maxfV i1t; V i2t; :::; V iQtg: (4)
The model of misclassication allows the probability of misclassication to depend on the
value of the latent variable V iqt. The misclassication probabilities are denoted as
jk = Pr(Oit = j j bOit = k); for j = 1; :::; Q; k = 1; :::; Q: (5)
4As in all selection models of this type, one can attempt to justify exclusion restrictions based on theory, but
ultimately they are untestable assumptions.
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That is, jk represents the probability that the occupation observed in the data is j, conditional
on the actual occupational choice being k. The s are estimated jointly along with the other
parameters in the model. The jj terms are the probabilities that occupational choices are
correctly classied. There areQQmisclassication probabilities, but there are only [(QQ) Q]
free parameters because the misclassication probabilities must sum to one for each possible
occupational choice,
QX
j=1
jk = 1; for k = 1; :::; Q: (6)
Following existing parametric models of misclassication, the model assumes that the mis-
classication probabilities fjk : k = 1; ::; Q; j = 1; :::; Qg depend only on j and k, and not on
the other explanatory variables in the model. One possible shortcoming of this baseline model
of occupational misclassication is that it rules out person specic heterogeneity in the propen-
sity to misclassify occupations that may be present in panel data such as the NLSY. Section
3.4 of this paper presents an extension of the model that allows for this type of within-person
correlation in misclassication rates.
It is necessary to specify the distributions of the error terms in the model before deriving the
likelihood function. Assume that "iqt  iid extreme value and eiqt  N(0; 2eq). Let i represent
a Q 1 vector of person is preferences for working in each occupation, and let i represent the
Q  1 vector of person is log wage intercepts in each occupation. Let F (; ) denote the joint
distribution of the wage intercepts and occupational preferences.
Let  represent the vector of parameters in the model,  = fk; kj; kj; kj; k; jk; ek; F (; ) :
k = 1; :::; Q; j = 1; :::; Qg: For brevity of notation, when it is convenient I suppress some or all
of the arguments f; Zit; Xit; Expikt; Lastoccikt; wobsit g at some points when writing equations for
probabilities and likelihood contributions, even though the choice probabilities and likelihood
contributions are functions of all of these variables. Dene bPit(q; wobsit ) as the joint probability
that person i chooses to work in occupation q in time period t and receives a wage of wobsit . The
outcome probability is
bPit( q; wobsit j ; ) = Pr(V iqt = maxfV i1t; V i2t; :::; V iQtg j wiqt = wobsit ) Pr(wiqt = wobsit ) : (7)
There is no closed form solution for this probability, so it is approximated using simulation meth-
ods. This involves taking random draws from the distribution of the errors, and computing the
mean of the simulated probabilities.5 The likelihood function for the observed data is constructed
5A consequence of the extreme value assumption is that conditional on ", this probability has a simple closed
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using the misclassication probabilities and the true choice probabilities. Dene Pit(q; wobsit ) as
the probability that person i is observed working in occupation q at time period t with a wage
of wobsit . This probability is the sum of the true occupational choice probabilities weighted by the
misclassication probabilities,
Pit(q; w
obs
it j ; ) =
QX
k=1
qk bPit(k; wobsit j ; ): (8)
Note that the outcome probability imposes the restriction that the observed wage is drawn
from the workers actual occupation, which rules out situations where a worker intentionally
misrepresents his occupation and simultaneously provides a false wage consistent with the false
occupation. The likelihood function is simply the product of the probabilities of observing the
sequence of occupational choices observed in the data for each person over the years that they
are in the sample,
L() =
NY
i=1
Z T (i)Y
t=1
QX
q=1
1fOit = qgPit(q; wobsit j ; )dF (; ) (9)
=
NY
i=1
Z
Li(j; )dF (; ); (10)
where 1fg denotes the indicator function which is equal to 1 if its argument is true and 0
otherwise. The likelihood function must be integrated over the joint distribution of skills and
preferences, F (; ). Following Heckman and Singer (1984), this distribution is specied as a
discrete multinomial distribution.6 Suppose that there are M types of people, each with a Q 1
vector of wage intercepts m and Q1 vector of preferences m. Let !m represent the proportion
of the mth type in the population. The unconditional likelihood function is simply a weighted
form solution. As a result it is straightforward to use a smooth simulator for the probabilities in the likelihood
function. During estimation, 60 draws from the distribution of the errors are used to simulate the integral.
Antithetic acceleration is used to reduce the variance of the simulated integral. As a check on the sensitivity of
the estimates to the number of simulation draws the optimization routine was re-started using 600 draws. The
parameter estimates (and value of the likelihood function at the maximum) were essentially unchanged by this
increase in the number of simulation draws.
6There is a large literature advocating the use of discrete distributions for unobserved heterogeneity. See, for
example, Mroz (1999).
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average of the type specic likelihoods,
L() =
NY
i=1
Z
Li(j; )dF (; )
=
NY
i=1
MX
m=1
!mLi( j i = m; i = m)
=
NY
i=1
Li() (11)
3.2 Evaluating the Likelihood Function
The major complication in evaluating the likelihood function arises from the fact that classica-
tion error in occupation codes creates non-classical measurement error in the observed occupation
specic work experience variables and previous occupational choice dummy variables that de-
scribe an individuals state. This implies that the true state of each agent is unobserved. Previous
research into occupational choices has not addressed this issue. The key to understanding the so-
lution to this problem is to realize that the model of misclassication implies a distribution of true
values of occupation specic work experience and lagged occupational choices for each individual
in each time period. Estimating the parameters of the model by maximum likelihood involves
integrating over the distribution of these unobserved state variables. However, there is no closed
form solution for this integral, and, more importantly, the distribution is intractably complex.
These problems are solved by simulating the likelihood function. The algorithm involves recur-
sively simulating R sequences of occupation specic work experience and lagged occupational
choices that span a workers entire career. The individuals likelihood contribution is computed
for each simulated sequence, and the path probabilities are averaged over the R sequences to
obtain the simulated likelihood contribution. A detailed description of the simulation algorithm
is presented in Appendix B.
3.3 Identication
This section presents the identication conditions for the occupational choice model with mis-
classication and discusses several related issues.
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3.3.1 Identication Conditions
The identication conditions for a model of misclassication in a binary dependant variable are
presented by Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998). This condition is extended to the
case of discrete choice models with more than two outcomes by Ramalho (2002). The parameters
of the model are identied if the sum of the conditional misclassication probabilities for each
observed outcome is smaller than the conditional probability of correct classication. In the
context of the occupational choice model presented in this paper this condition amounts to the
following restriction on the misclassication probabilities,
X
k 6=j
jk < jj; j = 1; :::; Q: (12)
This condition implies that it is not possible to estimate the extent of misclassication along
with the rest of the parameter vector if the quality of the data is so poor that one is more likely
to observe a misclassied occupational choice than a correctly classied occupational choice.
3.3.2 Discussion
Estimating the extent of classication error in the NLSY occupation data along with the parame-
ters of the occupational choice model is only possible if one is willing to adopt a parametric model
along with the associated functional form and distributional assumptions.7 It is worthwhile to
consider at an intuitive level how the parametric occupational choice model and misclassication
model are linked together. Let e represent the parameter vector for the occupational choice
model, and let e represent the vector of misclassication parameters. Given e, the parametric
model of occupational choices provides the probability that each occupational choice and wage
combination observed in the NLSY is generated by the model. Taking e as given, one could
choose the value of e that maximizes the probability of observing the NLSY occupation and
wage data. Broadly speaking, this will happen when the combinations of occupational choices
and wages that are unlikely to be generated by the model at the parameter vector e are assigned
a relatively high probability of being a¤ected by misclassication. During estimation, e is not
xed, it is estimated simultaneously with e, so estimating the model amounts to choosing the
value of e that best ts the data, with the added consideration that the chosen value of e allows
misclassication to account for some of the observed patterns in the data.
7It should be noted that as is the case with all parametric models of this type, if the model is mis-specied,
parameter estimates will be biased.
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Existing parametric models of misclassication estimate misclassication rates using discrete
choice models, while in contrast this paper jointly models discrete occupational choices along
with wages. The advantage of this approach is that to the extent that wages vary across occupa-
tions, observed wages provide information about which observed choices are likely to be a¤ected
by misclassication.8 This approach uses information about the relationship between observable
variables (such as education) and occupational choices, along with information about the con-
sistency of observed wages with reported occupations to infer the extent of misclassication in
the data. It should be noted that when occupations are measured with error, it is not possible
to nonparametrically determine the exact relationship between true occupational choices, wages,
and observable variables such as education. However, within a particular parametric model of
occupational choices and wages, these parameters can be estimated. 9
The availability of validation data on occupations from an outside data source would, in
principle, allow one to relax some of the parametric assumptions adopted in this paper. For
example, if another data set contained information about reported occupations, true occupations,
and possibly other explanatory variables, this information could be used to integrate out the e¤ect
of measurement error. Of course, this approach relies on the assumption that the measurement
error process is identical in the two sources of data. While this approach appears promising
and is certainly worth pursuing in future research, on a practical level adopting this approach
would most likely require additional data collection that was targeted specically at validating
occupation codes.10 One possible approach would be to validate an individuals occupation by
8In the extreme case where the wage distribution is identical across occupations observed wages do not pro-
vide any additional information about misclassication. However, even if the unconditional wage distribution is
identical across occupations, if the wage distribution in each occupation is a function of observable characteristics
(such as education and occupation specic experience), and the e¤ects of these variables on wages vary across
occupations, then observed wages will still provide information about misclassication.
9Although panel data is used to estimate the model, it is also possible to estimate this type of model using
cross sectional data. As an experiment, I randomly selected a cross section of workers from the panel data NLSY
sample and re-estimated the model. The estimated level of misclassication in the cross sectional version of the
model was 8%, compared to 9% in the panel data version. The fact that these estimates are so close suggests
that misclassication rates are primarily identied by the consistency of an individuals reported occupation with
the cross sectional distribution of choices, wages, and observable variables, rather than by the extent to which an
observed occupational choice is consistent with an individual workers observed sequence of career choices.
10The major problem is that existing validation studies, such as the 1977 supplement to the CPS, question
respondents about their occupation and then attempt to validate the reported occupations by surveying employers.
In general there is no reason to be condent that the employer surveys provide occupation data that is free from
error. Depending on the information contained in personnel les and the system that an employer uses to
categorize employees, the responses provided by rms could in fact be noisier than those provided by individuals.
As a result, it is generally accepted that these validation studies provide an upper bound on the extent of
measurement error. In contrast, validating wage data appears to be a much simpler task, since one would expect
that rms could normally provide accurate salary information from their payroll records.
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questioning his supervisor, since presumably supervisors know the type of work performed by
workers that they manage. This approach would circumvent some of the problems associated
with validating occupation codes using personnel records, which may or may not contain job
descriptions that accurately reect occupations.
3.4 An Extended Model: Heterogeneity in Misclassication Rates
The model of misclassication presented in Section 3.1 assumes that all individuals have the
same probability of having one of their occupational choices misclassied. In a panel data
setting such as the NLSY, it is possible that during the yearly NLSY interviews some individuals
consistently provide poor descriptions of their jobs that are likely to lead to measurement error
in the occupation codes created by the NLSY coders. On the other hand, some workers may
be more likely to provide accurate descriptions of their occupations that are extremely unlikely
to be misclassied. The remainder of this section extends the occupational choice model with
misclassication to allow for time persistent misclassication by using an approach similar to the
one adopted by Dustmann and van Soest (2001) in their study of misclassication of language
uency.
The primary goal of the extended model is to allow for person-specic heterogeneity in mis-
classication rates in a way that results in a tractable empirical model. Suppose that there
are three subpopulations of workers in the economy, and that these subpopulations each have
di¤erent probabilities of having their occupational choices misclassied. Dene the occupational
choice misclassication probabilities for subpopulation y as
jk(y) = Pr(Oit = jj bOit = k); j = 1; :::; Q; k = 1; :::; Q; (13)
QX
j=1
jk(y) = 1; k = 1; :::; Q; y = 1; 2; 3: (14)
Denote the proportion of subpopulation y in the economy as (y); where y = 1; 2; 3 and
3X
y=1
(y) =
1: This specication of the misclassication rates allows for time-persistence in misclassication,
since the jk(y)s are xed over time for each subpopulation. During estimation the (y)s and
jk(y)s of each subpopulation are estimated along with the other parameters of the model, so it
is necessary to specify the misclassication model in such a way that the number of parameters
in the model does not become unreasonably large. In order to keep the number of parameters
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at a tractable level, the number of subpopulations is set to a small number (3), and the mis-
classication probabilities are restricted during estimation so that the occupational choices of
subpopulation 1 are always correctly classied.11
This model of misclassication incorporates the key features of heterogeneous misclassica-
tion rates in a fairly parsimonious way. Some fraction of the population ((1)) is always correctly
classied, and the remaining two subpopulations are allowed to have completely di¤erent mis-
classication rates, so that both the overall level of misclassication and the particular patterns
in misclassication are allowed to vary between subpopulations.
The likelihood function presented in section 3.1 can be modied to account for person-specic
heterogeneity in misclassication. The observed choice probabilities are easily modied so that
they are allowed to vary by subpopulation,
Pit(q; w
obs
it j ; ; y) =
QX
k=1
qk(y) bPit(k; wobsit j ; ); (15)
where y = 1; 2; 3 indexes subpopulations. Conditional on subpopulations, the likelihood function
is
L(jy) =
NY
i=1
Z T (i)Y
t=1
QX
q=1
1fOit = qgPit(q; wobsit j ; ; y)dF (; ) (16)
=
NY
i=1
Z
Li(j; ; y)dF (; ); (17)
The subpopulation that a particular person belongs to is not observed, so the likelihood function
must be integrated over the discrete distribution of the type-specic misclassication rates,
L() =
NY
i=1
3X
y=1
MX
m=1
(y)!mLi( jy; i = m; i = m) (18)
=
NY
i=1
Li() :
4 Parameter Estimates
This section presents the simulated maximum likelihood parameter estimates for the occupational
choice model. First, the parameters that reveal the extent of classication error in reported occu-
pations are discussed, and then the parameter estimates from the occupational choice model that
11This version of the model already has 421 parameters that must be estimated, so in order to keep the model
tractable it was never estimated with more than three subpopulations.
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corrects for classication error and allows for person-specic heterogeneity in misclassication
are compared to the estimates from a model that does not correct for measurement error. Next,
the sensitivity of the estimates to measurement error in wages is examined. Finally, the model
is used to simulate data that is free from classication error in occupation codes.
4.1 The Extent of Measurement Error in Occupation Codes
The estimates of the misclassication probabilities for subpopulations 2 and 3 along with the
estimated proportions of each type in the population are presented in Panels A and B of Table
3. The bottom row of panel A shows that correcting for classication error results in a large
improvement in the t of the model, since the likelihood function improves from  18; 695 when
classication error is ignored to  17; 821 when classication error is corrected for. The proba-
bility in row i, column j is the estimate of ij(y), which is the probability that occupation i is
observed in the data conditional on occupation j being the actual choice for a person in subpop-
ulation y. For example, the entry in the third column of the rst row indicates that condition of
being a member of subpopulation 2, there is a 2:6% chance that a person who is actually a sales
worker will be misclassied as a professional worker. The diagonal elements of the two panels
of Table 3 show the probabilities that occupational choices are correctly classied. Averaged
across all occupations, the probability that an occupational choice is correctly classied is .868
for subpopulation 2 and :840 for subpopulation 3. One striking feature of the estimated misclas-
sication probabilities is that they provide substantial evidence that misclassication rates vary
widely across occupations. For example, in subpopulation 2 the probability that an occupational
choice is correctly classied ranges from a low of :56 for sales workers to a high of :99 for crafts-
men, while in subpopulation 3 the probability that an occupational choice is correctly classied
ranges from a low of :60 for sales workers to a high of :98 for operatives.
The estimates of the probabilities that a person belongs to subpopulations 2 and 3 are 42%
and 19%, which leaves an estimated 38% of the population belonging to subpopulation 1, the
group whose occupational choices are never misclassied. The fact that a substantial fraction of
the population belongs to the subpopulation whose occupational choices are never misclassied
highlights the importance of allowing for person-specic heterogeneity in misclassication rates.
When averaged over subpopulations, the subpopulation-specic misclassication rates indicate
that 91% of one-digit occupational choices are correctly classied. This estimate of the overall
extent of misclassication in the NLSY data is lower than the misclassication rates reported in
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validation studies based on other datasets. For example, Mellow and Sider (1983) nd an agree-
ment rate of 81% at the one-digit level between employees reported occupations and employers
occupational descriptions in the January 1977 Current Population Survey (CPS). Mathiowetz
(1992) nds a 76% agreement rate between the occupational descriptions given by workers of a
single large manufacturing rm and personnel records.12
One possible explanation for the lower misclassication rate found in this study compared to
the validation studies is that the NLSY occupation data is of higher quality than both the CPS
data and the survey conducted by Mathiowetz (1992). It appears that the procedures used by
the CPS and NLSY in constructing occupation codes are quite similar, so it is not clear that one
should expect the NLSY data to have a lower misclassication rate than the CPS. An alternative
explanation is that the employer reports of occupation codes that are assumed to be completely
free from classication error in validation studies are in fact measured with error.13 If this is true,
then comparing noisy self reported data to noisy employer reported data would cause validation
studies to overstate the extent of classication error in occupation codes. The idea that this
type of validation study may result in an overstatement of classication error in occupation or
industry codes is not a new one. For example, Krueger and Summers (1988) assume that the
error rate for one-digit industry classications is half as large as the one reported by Mellow
and Sider (1983) as a rough correction for the overstatement of classication error in validation
studies.
The wide variation in misclassication rates across occupations along with the patterns in
misclassication suggest that certain types of jobs are likely to be misclassied in particular
directions. In addition, the misclassication matrix is highly asymmetric. For example, there is
only a 1.4% chance that a manager will be misclassied as a sales worker, but there is a 21%
chance that a sales worker will be misclassied as a manager. Reading down the laborers column
of panel A of Table 3 shows that laborers are frequently misclassied as service workers (22%),
but service workers are very unlikely to be misclassied as laborers (.39%). Further evidence of
asymmetric misclassication is found throughout Table 3.
12This study is the rst to estimate a parametric model of occupational misclassication, so the validation
studies provide the only basis for comparison for the estimated misclassication rates.
13It is widely acknowledged that although validation studies are frequently based on the premise that one source
of data is completely free from error, in reality no source of data will be completely free from measurement error.
See Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001) for a discussion of this issue.
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4.2 Occupational Choice Model Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates for the occupational choice model estimated with and without correcting
for classication error are presented in Table 4. In addition, this table presents a measure of
the di¤erence between each parameter in the baseline (b) and classication error (ce) models,
(b   ce)=se(ce); where se(ce) is the standard error of ce. In the remainder of the paper
this standard error normalized di¤erence will be referred to as the normalized change in the
parameter.
4.2.1 Wage Equation
While theoretical results regarding the e¤ects of measurement error in simple linear models have
been derived, there are no clear predictions for nonlinear models such as this occupational choice
model. Broadly speaking, one would expect the patterns of misclassication present in the data
to be a key determinant of the magnitude and direction of the resulting bias. Due to the large
number of wage equation parameters, this discussion focuses on a small subset of parameter
estimates with the goal of demonstrating that classication error is something that needs to be
accounted for when estimating occupation specic wage equations. In addition, this discussion
will attempt to highlight the type of questions in general that one might receive misleading
answers to if one examines occupational choices and ignores misclassication.
The wage equation parameter estimates are presented in Panel A of Table 4. The estimates
of the wage equation for the professional occupation show a number of large changes in the es-
timated e¤ects of occupation specic work experience on wages between the model that ignores
classication error in occupations and the one that accounts for classication error. For ex-
ample, the e¤ect of a year of managerial experience on wages in the professional occupation
is biased downward by 42% from :064 to :037 when misclassication is ignored. The standard
error normalized di¤erence for this parameter is -2.19, so the bias appears relatively large rel-
ative to the standard error. The bias in this particular parameter is also interesting because
the estimated misclassication probabilities show that professionals are rarely misclassied as
managers (21(2) = :0066; 21(3) = :0099), and managers are rarely misclassied as profession-
als (12(2) = :0018; 12(3) = :0043). The low misclassication rates between these occupations
combined with the large bias in the experience coe¢ cient illustrates the point that even a small
amount of misclassication can produce large biases in estimates of the transferability of human
capital across occupations.
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Sales workers are the most frequently misclassied workers in both subpopulations 2 and 3.
Averaged across all three subpopulations, only 72% of sales workers are correctly classied. In
the most common subpopulation, sales workers are most likely to be misclassied as managers
(23(2) = :21), so one might expect signicant bias in estimates of the parameters of the man-
agerial and sales wage equations. The estimates show that ignoring classication error causes
the value of experience as a manager in the managerial occupation to be overstated by 19%
(normalized change = 1.99). In addition, ignoring classication error leads to the misleading
conclusion that one year of clerical experience increases wages by nearly 13% in the sales occupa-
tion, and this e¤ect is statistically signicant at the 5% level. However, once classication error
is corrected for, the estimated e¤ect of clerical experience on sales wages falls by 2/3, and the
e¤ect is not statistically di¤erent at conventional levels. Similarly, ignoring classication error
leads to an overstatement in the value of professional experience in the sales occupation (.0672
vs. .0308), although the normalized di¤erence for this parameter is only .67.
Further evidence of large changes in estimates of the transferability of human capital across
occupations is found in the craftsman occupation. The model that does not correct for classi-
cation error implies that a year of professional experience increases a craftsmans wages by 2:9%,
and this e¤ect is statistically signicant at the 5% level: Once classication error is accounted
for this e¤ect falls to 1:8% and it is not statistically di¤erent from zero at the 5% level. This
nding suggests that the type of skills accumulated during employment as a professional have
little or no value in craftsman jobs. It appears that the false transitions created by classication
error lead to an overstatement of the transferability of human capital between the professional
occupation and this seemingly unrelated lower skill occupation.
Another way of comparing the wage equations in the baseline and measurement error model
is to determine the number of hypothesis tests where the results of the test change between
the baseline and classication error models. For example, one hypothesis that is commonly of
interest is the null hypothesis that the e¤ect of each individual explanatory variable on wages
equals zero. Comparing the results of these hypothesis tests for the baseline model and the
classication error model shows that the rejection or acceptance of the null hypothesis at the
5% level changes for 17 variables in the wage equation between the two models. In other words,
ignoring classication error would cause one to mistakenly accept or reject the null hypothesis
that the e¤ect of an explanatory variable equals zero for 17 wage equation variables.
The nal parameters of the wage equation are the standard deviations of the random shock
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to wages in each occupation, eq, for q = 1; :::; 8. The estimates of these standard deviations
show that random uctuations in wages are overstated in six out of the eight occupations in the
model that ignores classication error. The intuition behind the direction of this bias is that the
model must provide an explanation for the large number of short duration occupation switches
that occur in the data. When classication error is ignored, the model accomplishes this through
relatively large transitory wage shocks.
The determinants of occupational choices have been the subject of considerable research
interest, and several recent papers have examined the related question of the role of occupation
specic human capital in determining wages. Although labor economists have typically focused
on determining the roles of rm tenure and general work experience in determining wages, new
evidence suggests that in fact occupation specic skills play an important role in determining
wages.14 Comparing the estimates of the wage equation found in this paper to existing estimates
is di¢ cult for a number of reasons. First, there is no existing paper that estimates directly
comparable occupation specic wage equations at the one-digit level. Second, existing papers
that estimate wage equations that are similar in some respects do not allow for the type of
cross-occupation experience e¤ects found in this study.15 However, overall the wage equation
estimates appear to be broadly consistent with existing research in this area. For example,
Both Kambourov and Manovskii (2007) and Sullivan (2007) nd that while experience in a
workerscurrent occupation has as an important e¤ect on wages, wages are strongly impacted
by total work experience. This nding is consistent with the relatively large cross occupation
experience e¤ects reported in this paper. Keane and Wolpin (1997) also nd relatively large
cross occupation experience e¤ects between blue collar and white collar employment, which is
again broadly consistent with the wage equation estimates reported in this paper. It is also
possible to get a rough sense of how the magnitudes of the estimated e¤ects of occupation
specic work experience on wages in this paper compare to existing research. The estimates in
this paper suggest that when classication error is ignored, averaged across all occupations one
year of occupation specic work experience increases wages by approximately 7%. Kambourov
and Manovskii (2007) do not report a parameter estimate that is directly comparable to this
number, but combining the di¤erent parameter estimates that they report suggest that wages
14See, for example, Kambourov and Manovskii (2007) and Sullivan (2007).
15Kambourov and Manovskii (2007) and Sullivan (2007) consider the special case of the wage equation estimated
in this paper where all of the cross occupation experience e¤ects are equal. However, these studies also consider
rm tenure and industry specic work experience. Keane and Wolpin (1997) allow for cross occupation experience
e¤ects, but their work uses occupation codes aggregated to the level of blue and white collar jobs.
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grow by approximately 5%-8% with each year that a worker spends in an occupation.
4.2.2 Non-pecuniary Utility Flows & Unobserved Heterogeneity
The occupational choice model presented in this paper allows occupational choices to depend
on non-pecuniary utility ows as well as wages. The importance of modelling occupational
choices in a utility maximizing framework rather than in an income maximizing framework is
demonstrated in work by Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Gould (2002). The parameter estimates
for the non-pecuniary utility ow equations for the models estimated with and without accounting
for classication error are presented in Panel B of Table 4. These results show that ignoring
classication error leads to signicant biases in estimates of the e¤ects of variables such as age,
education, and work experience on occupational choices.
The non-pecuniary utility ow parameters are all measured in log-wage units relative to the
base choice of service employment. For example, the estimate of the e¤ect of working as a pro-
fessional in the previous time period on the professional utility ow is 2:469 in the model that
ignores classication error. This means that a person who previously worked as a professional re-
ceives utility that is 2:469 log wage units higher than a person who was previously employed as a
service worker but is currently employed as a professional. The e¤ect of previous professional em-
ployment on the professional utility ow is biased downwards by 21% when classication error is
ignored (normalized di¤erence = -1.74). It appears that the false transitions between occupations
created by classication error lead to an understatement of the importance of state dependence
in professional employment. Overall, the estimates of the e¤ects of lagged occupational choices
on current occupation specic utility ows are fairly sensitive to classication error.
As is the case with the wage equation, another way of examining the consequences of not
correcting for misclassication is to determine the number of hypothesis tests where the results of
the test at the 5% level change between the baseline and classication error models. Comparing
the results of these hypothesis tests for the baseline model and the classication error model show
that the rejection or acceptance of the null hypothesis that the e¤ect of each variable equals zero
changes for 22 variables in the non-pecuniary utility ow equation between the two models. In
other words, ignoring classication error would cause one to mistakenly accept or reject the null
hypothesis that the e¤ect of an explanatory variable on non-pecuniary utility equals zero for 22
variables.
The estimates of the wage intercepts (s) and non-pecuniary intercepts (s) for the three
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types of people in the model are presented in Panel C of Table 4. These parameter estimates
reveal the extent of unobserved heterogeneity in skills and preferences for employment in each
occupation. The nal section of Panel C of Table 4 shows the averages of the wage and non-
pecuniary intercepts across the three types of people for the models that correct for and ignore
classication error in occupation codes. The largest bias among these parameters occurs in
parameters that measure preferences for employment in each occupation (s). For example,
the average preference for working as a craftsman changes from :048 in the model that ignores
classication error to :23 in the model that corrects for classication error. Biases of similar
magnitudes are found in the average preferences for employment as operatives and laborers. The
relatively large biases in estimates of preference parameters caused by ignoring classication error
occurs because unobserved heterogeneity in preferences helps explain occupational transitions
that are not well explained by the other parts of the model. When classication error is ignored
and all occupational transitions are treated as true occupation switches, the model attempts to
explain transitions that are not well explained by wages or the deterministic portion of non-
pecuniary utility ows in part through preference heterogeneity.
5 Simulating Data that is Free from Misclassication
One application of the model presented in this paper is that the estimated model can be used
to simulate occupational choice data that is free from classication error. The simulated data is
used to examine which workers tend to be identied as misclassied by the model, the predicted
patterns in misclassication over workerscareers, and the predicted relationship between wages
and misclassication.
5.1 Simulated Occupational Choices
5.1.1 Which Workers are Misclassied?
One explanatory variable that is of central importance when investigating occupational choices
is education, since there is strong sorting across occupations based on completed education.
Given this fact, it is useful to see how completed education levels vary between choices that are
identied as misclassied choices in the simulated data compared to choices that are identied
as correctly classied choices.
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Table 5 shows the distribution of completed education for correctly classied and misclassied
occupational choices, disaggregated by occupation. For example, the table shows that the model
predicts that 10.8% of those workers who are correctly classied as professionals have not com-
pleted any years of college, while 48.6% of workers who are misclassied as professionals have not
completed any years of college. A correctly classied professional has a 71.8% change of being a
college graduate, while a worker misclassied as a professional has only a 30.2% chance of being a
college graduate. Clearly, education serves as a strong predictor of which observations are likely
to be true professionals as opposed to observations that are falsely classied as professionals.
These results are consistent with the fact that the jobs located in the professional occupation are
overwhelmingly ones that require a college degree, or at least some amount of completed higher
education.
Across the other occupations, similarly strong and sensible relationships exist between ed-
ucation and misclassication. For example, in blue collar occupations, one would expect to
see the opposite relationship between misclassication and education from the one found in the
professional occupations. This is in fact what the results in Table 5 show. For example, the
percentage of correctly classied workers who have graduated from college is 2.1% for craftsmen,
2.5% for operatives, and 3.2% for laborers. In contrast, for workers who are falsely classied in
these occupations the percentage of workers who are college graduates is 18.7% for craftsmen,
21.5% for operatives, and 11.7% for laborers. In general, the model tends to ag workers as mis-
classied who have reported education levels that appear to be inconsistent with their reported
occupation.
5.1.2 The Frequency of Misclassication Over an Individuals Career
Given the panel nature of the data, the simulated occupational choice data can be used to
examine how often occupational choices are misclassied over a typical individuals career. Table
6 presents the distribution of the total number of times that occupational choices are misclassied
over the course of a persons career. The majority of workers never experience misclassication
(57.2%), 17.6% of workers are misclassied once over their career, and very few workers are
misclassied more than ve times over their career (4.3%). Table 6 also provides information
about the distribution of the lengths of misclassication spells. For example, the rst entry in the
nal column of Table 6 shows that conditional on an occupational choice being misclassied, there
is a 72.9% chance that the person will be correctly classied in the next survey. Conditional on
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being misclassied, there is an 18.3% chance that a person will be misclassied in two consecutive
periods, and there is only a 5.2% chance that a person will be misclassied in three consecutive
periods.16
5.1.3 True Occupational Choices, Observed Choices, and Wages
Table 7 shows the average true occupational choice probabilities conditional on observed choices
and observed wages that are predicted by the empirical model. This analysis shows how the
classication error rates generated by the model vary with observed wages and provides a more
detailed analysis of the type of occupational choice and wage combinations that are likely to be
a¤ected by classication error.
Observed occupational choices are listed in the far left column of Table 7, while actual oc-
cupational choices are listed in the top row. Conditional on the observed choice and wage (and
all of the other explanatory variables), the model is used to calculate the conditional probability
that the actual choice is each of the eight occupations for each occupational choice observed in
the data. The average of each probability for each occupation is presented in Table 7. Proba-
bilities are disaggregated by the percentile of the observed wage in the wage distribution of the
observed occupation to show how misclassication rates vary with observed wages. For example,
the top left cell of Table 7 shows that a worker observed in the data as a professional worker
with a wage in the top 10% of the professional wage distribution has a 90.9% chance of being
correctly classied as a professional worker. However, a worker observed as a professional with
a wage in the bottom 10% of the professional distribution has only a 75.7% chance of actually
being a professional worker. People observed in the data as low wage professional workers are
primarily service workers (9.5%).
Similar patterns of misclassication are found in the sales and clerical occupations, where
workers in certain areas of the wage distribution are more likely to be misclassied than those in
other areas of the wage distribution. For example, 91:6% of clerical workers in the top 10% of the
clerical wage distribution are correctly classied, but 3:9% of those observed as high wage clerical
workers are actually professionals. However, the unconditional probability that a professional is
misclassied as a clerical worker is much lower (41(2) = :013; 41(3) = :013).
16One implication of the relatively short durations of misclassication spells is that the model does not tend to
repeatedly ag individuals as misclassied who have consistently high (or low) wages for their reported occupation
over the course of their entire career.
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5.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Measurement Error in Wages
One important question regarding the model presented in this paper is the sensitivity of the
results to the existence of measurement error in wages. One way of addressing this question is
to simulate noisy wage data, re-estimate the model using the noisy wage data (leaving the rest
of the NLSY data unchanged), and see how the estimates of misclassication parameters change
when the noisy wage data is used in place of the actual wages found in the NLSY data. The
noisy wages (wmeit ) are generated using the following equation,
wmeit = w
obs
it + it; where it  N(0; 2): (19)
Recall that wobsit is a log wage, so the extent of measurement error in the noisy log wage data
is captured by 2 . A number of validation studies have quantied the extent of measurement
error in wages, see Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001) for a thorough survey of this literature.
Actual estimates of 2 do not exist for the NLSY, so in simulating the noisy data the measurement
error term is set towards the upper end of the reported estimates found in the literature based
on other data sources. The exact value used is 2 = :10: This value of 
2
 creates a substantial
amount of measurement error in the noisy wage data, since in the noisy data, measurement error
accounts for approximately one third of the total variation in log wages.
Rather that presenting a complete set of parameter estimates for the misclassication model
estimated using the noisy data, it is su¢ cient to summarize the overall e¤ect that the noisy
wage data has on the parameter estimates. When the noisy wage data is used in place of
the NLSY wage data the average parameter in the model changes by approximately 2%, so it
appears that the overall bias introduced by measurement error is relatively small. The primary
concern about measurement error in wages is that it may impact the estimates of the extent of
measurement error in occupation codes. The overall extent of misclassication is summarized
by the diagonal elements of the misclassication rate matrices for subpopulations two and three,
jj(y); j = 1; :::; Q; y = 2; 3. Across both subpopulations, the use of noisy wage data results
in the average probability of correct classication decreasing by only  :006 from :8546 to :8486.
Adding measurement error slightly increases the overall estimated rate of misclassication, but
the magnitude of the increase is quite small. The corresponding average absolute change in
the probability of correct classication is only :008, and the average change in the o¤-diagonal
elements is only :0015, so it appears that estimates of the overall extent of misclassication in
the NLSY occupation data are quite robust to measurement error in wages.
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There are a number of reasons why the estimates of the misclassication parameters are
robust to a relatively large amount of measurement error in wages. The rst reason is that,
as discussed earlier in the paper, wages are not the only source of information that the model
uses to infer that an occupational choice is misclassied. Another key point is that many of
the occupational choices that are agged in the simulations as misclassications are associated
with extremely large di¤erences between the reported wage and the average wage in the reported
occupation. Di¤erences of this magnitude are unlikely to be generated in large numbers by a
reasonable amount of measurement error in wages. For example, the median wage for workers
who are identied in the simulations as falsely classied professionals is $5.59, while the median
wage for workers who are correctly classied as professionals is $10.32.
6 Conclusion
Although occupational choices have been a topic of considerable research interest, existing re-
search has not studied occupational choices in a framework that addresses the biases created by
classication error in self-reported occupation data. This paper develops an approach to estimat-
ing a panel data occupational choice model that corrects for classication error in occupations
by incorporating a model of misclassication within an occupational choice model. Estimating
this model provides a solution to the problems created by measurement error in the discrete de-
pendant variable of an occupational choice model. Methodologically, this approach contributes
to the literature on misclassication in discrete dependant variables by demonstrating how sim-
ulation methods can be used to address the problems created in a panel data setting where
measurement error in a discrete dependant variable creates measurement error in explanatory
variables. The simulation technique is applicable to any discrete choice panel data model where
misclassication in a current period dependent variable creates measurement error in future ex-
planatory variables. This paper also contributes to the literature on misclassication by using
observed wages within the framework of an occupational choice model to obtain information
about misclassied occupational choices.
The main ndings of this paper are that a substantial number of occupational choices in the
NLSY are a¤ected by misclassication, with an overall misclassication rate of 9%. The results
also suggest that person-specic heterogeneity in misclassication rates is an important feature
of the data. An estimated 38% of the population never experiences a misclassied occupational
choice, and the remaining two subpopulations have substantially di¤erent propensities to have
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their occupational choices misclassied in particular directions. The parameter estimates also
indicate that misclassication rates vary widely across occupations, and that the probability of
a worker being misclassied into each occupation is strongly inuenced by the workers actual
occupation. Most importantly, this paper demonstrates the large bias in parameter estimates
that results from estimating a model of occupational choices that ignores the fact that occupa-
tions are frequently misclassied. Consistent with existing research in the area of misclassied
dependant variables, the results show that even relatively small amounts of misclassication cre-
ates substantial bias in parameter estimates. Especially large biases are found in parameters
that measure the transferability of occupation specic work experience across occupations, since
these parameters are quite sensitive to the false occupational transitions created by classication
error.
Overall, the results indicate that one should use caution when interpreting the parameter
estimates from occupational choice models that are estimated without correcting for classication
error in self-reported occupations. In addition, these results suggest that similar bias may arise
when occupation dummy variables are used as explanatory variables, as is commonly done in a
wide range of studies. A possible avenue for future research would be to investigate the e¤ects
of classication error in occupation codes on parameter estimates in this wider class of models,
such as simple wage regressions that make use of self-reported occupation data.
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Table 1a: Description of Occupations 
 
One-Digit Occupation Mean Wage Example Three-Digit Occupations 
Professional, technical & kindred 
workers $11.19 
Accountants, chemical engineers, physicians, 
social scientists 
Managers & administrators $12.89 Bank officers, office managers, school administrators 
Sales workers $9.05 Advertising salesmen, real estate agents, stock and bond salesmen, salesmen and sales clerks 
Clerical & unskilled workers $7.48 Bank tellers, cashiers, receptionists, secretaries 
Craftsmen & kindred workers $8.53 Carpenters, electricians, machinists, stonemasons, mechanics 
Operatives $7.20 Dry wall installers, butchers, drill press operatives, truck drivers 
Laborers $7.01 Garbage collectors, groundskeepers, freight handlers, vehicle washers 
Service workers $6.34 Janitors, child care workers, waiters, guards and watchmen 
Notes: Based on the U.S Census occupation codes found in the 1979 cohort of the NLSY. Wages 
are in 1979 dollars. 
 
Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable NLSY Estimation 
Sample 
Broader Sample from 
NLSY (for comparison) 
Age 24.4 25.5 
Years of high school 3.5 3.7 
Years of College 1.2 1.0 
Log wage 1.95 1.98 
North central .32 - 
South .30 - 
West .17  - 
Professional .14 .12 
Managers .11 .11 
Sales .05 .06 
Clerical .08 .08 
Craftsmen .25 .24 
Operatives .17 .20 
Laborers .10 .11 
Service .09 .10 
Number of observations 10,573 20,073 
Number of individuals 954 1,932 
Note: log wages in 1979 dollars. The NLSY estimation sample is described in Appendix A. The 
broader sample relaxes an age restriction imposed on the estimation sample so it contains more 
individuals. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Occupational Transition Matrix – NLSY Data (top entry) and Simulated 
Data (bottom entry) 
 Professional Managers Sales Clerical Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service Total 
Professional  74.7 78.5 
6.9 
5.6 
2.3 
4.2 
4.5 
3.7 
5.0 
3.2 
3.0 
2.2 
1.3 
1.4 
2.2 
1.2 100 
Managers  6.4 6.6 
57.4 
58.5 
7.2 
9.4 
7.3 
7.4 
10.7 
10.3 
3.5 
2.9 
2.5 
2.6 
5.0 
2.3 100 
Sales  8.0 7.6 
14.9 
9.2 
53.5 
55.2 
7.7 
6.3 
5.4 
6.8 
5.2 
5.9 
2.2 
5.2 
3.2 
3.6 100 
Clerical  10.3 8.7 
12.4 
11.4 
5.9 
7.2 
44.8 
45.8 
6.8 
6.3 
7.0 
6.8 
8.3 
9.8 
4.6 
4.0 100 
Craftsmen  2.9 2.0 
5.3 
4.7 
1.0 
2.3 
2.2 
2.0 
66.6 
67.4 
11.1 
10.8 
8.1 
9.6 
2.6 
1.2 100 
Operatives 2.4 1.9 
2.2 
1.3 
2.1 
3.3 
3.1 
2.9 
18.4 
18.3 
56.8 
56.3 
10.1 
11.6 
4.9 
4.4 100 
Laborers 2.7 2.5 
3.3 
2.7 
1.8 
4.0 
7.9 
7.3 
23.2 
21.6 
18.6 
16.5 
36.2 
39.1 
6.1 
6.2 100 
Service  3.9 3.7 
7.8 
4.2 
1.5 
2.8 
3.5 
3.1 
8.4 
6.8 
6.8 
6.2 
8.6 
9.5 
59.5 
63.7 100 
Total 14.0 13.9 
11.5 
9.5 
5.3 
7.9 
7.6 
7.3 
25.8 
25.2 
16.9 
16.2 
9.6 
11.5 
9.4 
8.4 100 
Entries are the percentage of employment spells starting in the occupation listed in the left column that end in 
the occupation listed in the top row. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3, Panel A: Parameter Estimates- Misclassification Probabilities for Subpopulation 2 
(αjk(2)) 
Observed/Actual Professional Managers Sales Clerical Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service 
Professional  .9570 (.0023) 
.0018 
(.0096) 
.0264 
(.0025) 
.0017 
(.0074) 
.0033 
(.0002) 
.0007 
(.0004) 
.0380 
(.0004) 
.0641 
(.0017) 
Managers  .0066 (.0041) 
.9762 
(.0042) 
.2128 
(.0026) 
.0052 
(.0082) 
.0013 
(.0002) 
.0021 
(.0015) 
.0011 
(.0022) 
.0238 
(.0003) 
Sales  .0036 (.0016) 
.0148 
(.0046) 
.5578 
(.0001) 
.0133 
(.0045) 
.0000 
(.0015) 
.0029 
(.0017) 
.0019 
(.0040) 
.0774 
(.0009) 
Clerical  .0131 (.0002) 
.0031 
(.0101) 
.0131 
(.0055) 
.9579 
(.0046) 
.0002 
(.0016) 
.0021 
(.0022) 
.0046 
(.0067) 
.0042 
(.0033) 
Craftsmen  .0055 (.0023) 
.0022 
 (.0045) 
.1063 
(.0098) 
.0052 
(.0025) 
.9897 
(.0054) 
.0055 
(.0030) 
.0204 
(.0121) 
.0024 
(.0023) 
Operatives .0121 (.0025) 
.0000 
(.0064) 
.0456 
(.0005) 
.0013 
(.0082) 
.0000 
(.0039) 
.9849 
(.0058) 
.0063 
(.0009) 
.0004 
(.0223) 
Laborers .0000 (.0003) 
.0000  
(.0131) 
.0164 
(.0043) 
.0136 
(.0085) 
.0054 
(.0021) 
.0016 
(.0082) 
.7029 
(.0014) 
.0039 
(.0079) 
Service  .0018 (.0002) 
.0018 
(.0043) 
.0213 
(.0008) 
.0014 
(.0086) 
.0000 
(.0018) 
.0000 
(.0022) 
.2243 
(.0012) 
.8235 
(.0068) 
Pr(subpopulation 2) .4243 (.0211)        
 Ignore misclassification 
Correct for 
misclassification       
Log-likelihood -18,695 -17,821       
Notes: Element α(i,j) of this table, where i refers to the row and j refers to the column is the probability that occupation i is observed, 
conditional on j being the true choice: α(j,k)=Pr(occupation j observed | occupation k is true choice). Standard errors in parentheses. 
“Subpopulation” refers to the fact that the misclassification model controls for unobserved heterogeneity in misclassification rates by 
allowing for a discrete number of subpopulations that are each allowed to have different misclassification matrices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3, Panel B : Misclassification Probabilities for Subpopulation 3 (αij(3)) 
Observed/Actual Professional Managers Sales Clerical Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service 
Professional  .9289  (.0022) 
.0043 
 (.0097) 
 .0394 
(.0024) 
 .0012 
(.0079) 
.0357 
(.0005) 
.0007 
(.0003) 
.0104 
 (.0003) 
.0190 
(.0016) 
Managers  .0099  (.0040) 
.9641 
 (.004) 
 .0822 
(.0027) 
.0032 
 (.0081) 
 .0046 
(.0003) 
 .0030 
(.0016) 
.0041 
 (.0021) 
.2548 
 (.0002) 
Sales  .0096  (.0016) 
 .0248 
(.0056) 
 .6007 
(.0001) 
.0125 
(.0046) 
.0002 
(.0016) 
.0003 
 (.0018) 
 .0022 
(.0041) 
.0026 
 (.0008) 
Clerical  .0126  (.0001) 
.0027 
 (.0103) 
 .0052 
(.0054) 
 .9634 
(.0045) 
 .0004 
(.0011) 
.0012 
 (.0023) 
.0031 
 (.0061) 
.0006 
 (.0037) 
Craftsmen  .0234  (.0024) 
.0025 
 (.0043) 
 .0904 
(.0096) 
.0068 
(.0024) 
.9475 
(.0061) 
.0067 
 (.0031) 
.0504 
 (.0130) 
 .0041 
(.0026) 
Operatives .0106  (.0026) 
.0007 
(.0065) 
 .1335 
(.0005) 
 .0029 
(.0081) 
 .00000 
 (.0047) 
.9833 
 (.0051) 
 .0054 
(.0008) 
.0000 
(.0001) 
Laborers .0000  (.0001) 
 .0000 
(.0141) 
 .0307 
(.0041) 
.0082 
(.0084) 
.0114  
(.0020) 
.0040 
 (.0084) 
.6215 
 (.0005) 
 .0042 
(.0069) 
Service  .0049  (.0002) 
.0008 
  (.0043) 
 .0176 
(.0009) 
 .0016 
(.0088) 
.0000 
(.0017) 
.0006 
 (.0024) 
.3028 
 (.0008) 
.7139 
 (.0048) 
Pr(subpopulation 3 .1937 (.0235)        
Notes: Element α(i,j) of this table, where i refers to the row and j refers to the column is the probability that occupation i is observed, 
conditional on j being the true choice: α(j,k)=Pr(occupation j observed | occupation k is true choice). Standard errors in parentheses. 
“Subpopulation” refers to the fact that the misclassification model controls for unobserved heterogeneity in misclassification rates by 
allowing for a discrete number of subpopulations that are each allowed to have different misclassification matrices. 
 
 
 
Table 4 Panel A: Parameter Estimates – Wage Equation 
 
Wage 
equation 
Professional  Normalized 
difference 
Managers  Normalized 
difference 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age 0.0233 (0.0154) 
0.0079 
(0.0073) 2.12 
0.0474 
(0.0184) 
0.0351 
(0.0091) 1.35 
Age2/100 -0.2280 (0.0985) 
-0.1434 
(0.0426) -1.98 
-0.4028 
(0.1230) 
-0.3543 
(0.0630) -0.77 
Education 0.0734 (0.0057) 
0.0626 
(0.0041) 2.66 
0.0825 
(0.0082) 
0.0837 
(0.0060) -0.20 
Professional 
experience 
0.0715 
(0.0053) 
0.0687 
(0.0034) 0.81 
0.0944 
(0.0130) 
0.0896 
(0.0086) 0.56 
Managerial 
experience 
0.0375 
(0.0158) 
0.0644 
(0.0123) -2.19 
0.0656 
(0.0071) 
0.0547 
(0.0055) 1.99 
Sales 
experience 
0.0493 
(0.0147) 
0.0499 
(0.0101) -0.06 
0.0888 
(0.0135) 
0.0879 
(0.0097) 0.09 
Clerical 
experience 
0.0430 
(0.0191) 
0.0377 
(0.0162) 0.33 
0.0191 
(0.0096) 
0.0209 
(0.0073) -0.25 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.0280 
(0.0092) 
0.0203 
(0.0100) 0.77 
0.0488 
(0.0074) 
0.0556 
(0.0062) -1.10 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0447 
(0.0236) 
0.0259 
(0.0210) 0.90 
0.0634 
(0.0124) 
0.0705 
(0.0121) -0.59 
Laborer 
experience 
0.0146 
(0.0291) 
-0.0083 
(0.0232) 0.99 
0.0416 
(0.0268) 
0.0233 
(0.0179) 1.02 
Service 
experience 
0.0000 
(0.0224) 
0.0718 
(0.0234) -3.07 
0.0100 
(0.0140) 
0.0069 
(0.0117) 0.26 
North central -0.0635 (0.0262) 
-0.0139 
(0.0189) -2.63 
-0.1063 
(0.0302) 
-0.0667 
(0.0233) -1.70 
South -0.0448 (0.0245) 
0.0222 
(0.0182) -3.69 
-0.0726 
(0.0345) 
-0.0849 
(0.0284) 0.43 
West 0.0412 (0.0294) 
0.1046 
(0.0205) -3.09 
-0.0919 
(0.0438) 
-0.0531 
(0.0311) -1.25 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Normalized difference = [β(ignore class. error)- β(correct for class. 
error)]/[Standard error of β(correct for class. error)]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Panel A: Parameter Estimates – Wage Equations 
 
Wage 
equation 
Sales  Normalized 
difference 
Clerical  Normalized 
difference 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age 0.0662 (0.0368) 
0.1354 
(0.0272) -2.55 
0.0480 
(0.0153) 
0.0413 
(0.0157) 0.43 
Age2/100 -1.0006 (0.2662) 
-1.0984 
(0.1886) 0.52 
-0.4330 
(0.1057) 
-0.3588 
(0.1095) -0.68 
Education 0.1837 (0.0189) 
0.1593 
(0.0268) 0.91 
0.0528 
(0.0087) 
0.0511 
(0.0081) 0.21 
Professional 
experience 
0.0672 
(0.0366) 
0.0308 
(0.0542) 0.67 
0.0957 
(0.0146) 
0.1051 
(0.0230) -0.41 
Managerial 
experience 
0.1316 
(0.0274) 
0.1089 
(0.0322) 0.71 
0.0454 
(0.0104) 
0.0418 
(0.0121) 0.30 
Sales 
experience 
0.1774 
(0.0163) 
0.1571 
(0.0195) 1.04 
0.0806 
(0.0162) 
0.0888 
(0.0203) -0.40 
Clerical 
experience 
0.1281 
(0.0333) 
0.0430 
(0.0433) 1.97 
0.0562 
(0.0085) 
0.0572 
(0.0093) -0.11 
Craftsmen 
experience 
-0.0183 
(0.0258) 
-0.0453 
(0.0297) 0.91 
0.0502 
(0.0083) 
0.0646 
(0.0119) -1.21 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0845 
(0.0284) 
0.0845 
(0.0297) 0.00 
0.0516 
(0.0118) 
0.0500 
(0.0125) 0.13 
Laborer 
experience 
0.0507 
(0.0431) 
0.0521 
(0.0552) -0.03 
0.0420 
(0.0167) 
0.0345 
(0.0153) 0.49 
Service 
experience 
0.0241 
(0.0295) 
-0.0657 
(0.0826) 1.09 
0.0191 
(0.0177) 
0.0215 
(0.0183) -0.13 
North central -0.2505 (0.0754) 
-0.3711 
(0.1051) 1.15 
-0.1688 
(0.0311) 
-0.1965 
(0.0369) 0.75 
South 0.1225 (0.0764) 
0.1249 
(0.0915) -0.03 
-0.0847 
(0.0307) 
-0.1030 
(0.0377) 0.49 
West 0.0979 (0.0945) 
0.1015 
(0.1070) -0.03 
-0.0228 
(0.0342) 
-0.0230 
(0.0362) 0.01 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Normalized difference = [β(ignore class. error)- β(correct for class. 
error)]/[Standard error of β(correct for class. error)]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Panel A: Parameter Estimates – Wage Equations 
 
Wage 
equation 
Craftsmen  Normalized 
difference 
Operatives  Normalized 
difference 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age 0.0606 (0.0068) 
0.0489 
(0.0053) 2.21 
0.0128 
(0.0085) 
0.0123 
(0.0073) 0.07 
Age2/100 -0.5257 (0.0481) 
-0.4576 
(0.0398) -1.71 
-0.2230 
(0.0642) 
-0.2605 
(0.0604) 0.62 
Education 0.0290 (0.0048) 
0.0254 
(0.0045) 0.80 
0.0209 
(0.0054) 
0.0079 
(0.0048) 2.74 
Professional 
experience 
0.0290 
(0.0120) 
0.0188 
(0.0210) 0.49 
0.0670 
(0.0229) 
0.0751 
(0.0344) -0.24 
Managerial 
experience 
0.0558 
(0.0115) 
0.0646 
(0.0113) -0.78 
0.0432 
(0.0157) 
0.0552 
(0.0152) -0.79 
Sales 
experience 
0.0100 
(0.0169) 
0.0438 
(0.0183) -1.85 
0.0200 
(0.0149) 
0.0157 
(0.0176) 0.24 
Clerical 
experience 
0.0381 
(0.0125) 
0.0366 
(0.0210) 0.07 
0.0499 
(0.0110) 
0.0370 
(0.0191) 0.68 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.0591 
(0.0028) 
0.0605 
(0.0027) -0.52 
0.0607 
(0.0067) 
0.0764 
(0.0062) -2.52 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0386 
(0.0052) 
0.0352 
(0.0048) 0.71 
0.0549 
(0.0045) 
0.0470 
(0.0041) 1.92 
Laborer 
experience 
0.0217 
(0.0069) 
0.0114 
(0.0066) 1.57 
0.0708 
(0.0090) 
0.0512 
(0.0077) 2.56 
Service 
experience 
0.0254 
(0.0094) 
0.0361 
(0.0106) -1.00 
-0.0023 
(0.0149) 
0.0285 
(0.0147) -2.10 
North central -0.1034 (0.0197) 
-0.1201 
(0.0185) 0.91 
-0.0637 
(0.0266) 
-0.0948 
(0.0222) 1.40 
South -0.0786 (0.0209) 
-0.0828 
(0.0182) 0.23 
0.0234 
(0.0270) 
0.0026 
(0.0222) 0.94 
West 0.0847 (0.0210) 
0.0868 
(0.0208) -0.10 
0.0086 
(0.0307) 
-0.0043 
(0.0268) 0.48 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Normalized difference = [β(ignore class. error)- β(correct for class. 
error)]/[Standard error of β(correct for class. error)]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Panel A: Parameter Estimates – Wage Equations 
 
Wage 
equation 
Laborers  Normalized 
difference 
Service  Normalized 
difference 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age 0.0268 (0.0119) 
0.0235 
(0.0119) 0.28 
-0.0083 
(0.0120) 
-0.0116 
(0.0093) 0.35 
Age2/100 -0.3202 (0.0994) 
-0.3339 
(0.0961) 0.14 
0.0234 
(0.0889) 
0.0314 
(0.0666) -0.12 
Education 0.0331 (0.0087) 
0.0184 
(0.0077) 1.92 
0.0965 
(0.0071) 
0.0864 
(0.0070) 1.45 
Professional 
experience 
0.0715 
(0.0515) 
0.0295 
(0.0905) 0.46 
0.0285 
(0.0359) 
0.0274 
(0.0258) -9.49 
Managerial 
experience 
0.0457 
(0.0232) 
0.0597 
(0.0478) -0.29 
0.0294 
(0.0151) 
0.0419 
(0.0316) -0.40 
Sales 
experience 
-0.0165 
(0.0633) 
0.0364 
(0.0378) -1.40 
0.0132 
(0.0178) 
-0.0121 
(0.0414) 0.61 
Clerical 
experience 
0.0445 
(0.0234) 
0.0401 
(0.0247) 0.18 
0.0240 
(0.0185) 
0.0086 
(0.0391) 0.39 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.0559 
(0.0082) 
0.0683 
(0.0088) -1.41 
0.0681 
(0.0103) 
0.0167 
(0.0362) 1.42 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0525 
(0.0083) 
0.0584 
(0.0088) -0.67 
0.0304 
(0.0179) 
-0.0382 
(0.0199) 3.44 
Laborer 
experience 
0.0504 
(0.0085) 
0.0556 
(0.0083) -0.63 
0.0177 
(0.0219) 
0.0674 
(0.0341) -1.46 
Service 
experience 
0.0040 
(0.0158) 
0.0009 
(0.0195) 0.16 
0.0562 
(0.0066) 
0.0542 
(0.0062) 0.32 
North central -0.0866 (0.0393) 
-0.0675 
(0.0363) -0.53 
-0.2492 
(0.0291) 
-0.2297 
(0.0239) -0.81 
South -0.1109 (0.0408) 
-0.0859 
(0.0376) -0.67 
-0.1181 
(0.0304) 
-0.0865 
(0.0315) -1.00 
West -0.0043 (0.0492) 
0.0235 
(0.0524) -0.53 
-0.1278 
(0.0290) 
-0.1273 
(0.0307) -0.02 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Normalized difference = [β(ignore class. error)- β(correct for class. 
error)]/[Standard error of β(correct for class. error)]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Panel A: Parameter Estimates – Error Standard Deviations 
Occupation    
 Ignore classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification error 
Normalized 
difference 
Professional  0.3249 (0.0055) 
0.2394 
(0.0069) 3.41 
Managers  0.3701 (0.0080) 
0.2493 
(0.0163) 1.33 
Sales  0.5724 (0.0217) 
0.6850 
(0.0248) -2.56 
Clerical  0.2763 (0.0136) 
0.2636 
(0.0211) 1.70 
Craftsmen  0.3039 (0.0051) 
0.2683 
(0.0068) 6.40 
Operatives 0.3317 (0.0063) 
0.2643 
(0.0105) 3.56 
Laborers 0.3364 (0.0109) 
0.3411 
(0.0122) -0.20 
Service  0.3250 (0.0090) 
0.2802 
(0.0154) 0.57 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Normalized difference = [β(ignore class. error)- β(correct for class. 
error)]/[Standard error of β(correct for class. error)]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Panel B: Parameter Estimates – Non-pecuniary Utility 
 
 Professionals  Normalized 
difference 
Managers  Normalized 
difference 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 1.89 
Age 0.1203 (0.0799) 
0.0973 
(0.0305) 0.75 
-0.0409 
(0.0809) 
-0.1448 
(0.0551) -1.40 
Age2/100 -0.2295 (0.6142) 
-0.0345 
(0.2001) 0.97 
0.4907 
(0.5784) 
1.0633 
(0.4094) -2.02 
Education 0.4260 (0.0543) 
0.4715 
(0.0370) -1.23 
0.2145 
(0.0570) 
0.2631 
(0.0240) 0.35 
High school 
diploma 
-0.6393 
(0.2354) 
-0.3529 
(0.2103) -1.36 
-0.2384 
(0.2213) 
-0.3125 
(0.2106) -0.99 
College 
diploma 
0.0984 
(0.1881) 
0.3509 
(0.2144) -1.18 
0.2867 
(0.2013) 
0.5197 
(0.2353) -0.46 
Professional 
experience 
0.4819 
(0.1484) 
0.4894 
(0.1162) -0.06 
0.3134 
(0.1468) 
0.3707 
(0.1250) -0.63 
Managerial 
experience 
-0.0761 
(0.0830) 
-0.0229 
(0.1472) -0.36 
0.2605 
(0.0688) 
0.3433 
(0.1308) -0.17 
Sales 
experience 
-0.1569 
(0.1171) 
-0.1803 
(0.1604) 0.15 
0.0811 
(0.1009) 
0.1052 
(0.1430) -0.75 
Clerical 
experience 
-0.1028 
(0.1126) 
-0.0184 
(0.1637) -0.52 
0.1471 
(0.0860) 
0.2410 
(0.1249) -1.08 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.1531 
(0.0657) 
0.2813 
(0.1271) -1.01 
0.2197 
(0.0579) 
0.3523 
(0.1224) -1.06 
Operatives 
experience 
-0.1836 
(0.0874) 
-0.1056 
(0.1784) -0.44 
0.0218 
(0.0608) 
0.1383 
(0.1102) -1.39 
Laborer 
experience 
-0.0459 
(0.1420) 
0.1008 
(0.2052) -0.71 
-0.0207 
(0.1182) 
0.2366 
(0.1849) 0.10 
Service 
experience 
-0.4737 
(0.0645) 
-0.8955 
(0.1467) 2.88 
-0.2765 
(0.0574) 
-0.2843 
(0.0820) -1.62 
Previously a 
professional 
2.469 
(0.339) 
3.108 
(0.368) -1.74 
1.237 
(0.379) 
2.022 
(0.484) -1.47 
Previously a 
manager 
0.792 
(0.340) 
1.181 
(0.665) -0.59 
2.780 
(0.261) 
3.717 
(0.636) 0.14 
Previously 
sales 
1.194 
(0.459) 
0.893 
(0.594) 0.51 
1.703 
(0.432) 
1.623 
(0.591) -1.20 
Previously 
clerical 
1.628 
(0.354) 
1.546 
(0.364) 0.22 
1.853 
(0.322) 
2.198 
(0.287) -1.71 
Previously a 
craftsman 
1.042 
(0.298) 
1.064 
(0.485) -0.05 
1.673 
(0.294) 
2.482 
(0.472) -0.18 
Previously an 
operative 
0.752 
(0.305) 
0.537 
(0.488) 0.44 
0.400 
(0.320) 
0.493 
(0.516) -0.20 
Previously a 
laborer 
0.634 
(0.346) 
0.341 
(0.509) 0.58 
0.839 
(0.333) 
0.931 
(0.471) 1.89 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Normalized difference = [β(ignore class. error)- β(correct for class. 
error)]/[Standard error of β(correct for class. error)]. 
 
Table 4 Panel B: Parameter Estimates – Non-pecuniary Utility 
 
 Sales  Normalized 
difference 
Clerical  Normalized 
difference 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age -0.1327 (0.1137) 
-0.3511 
(0.0484) 4.52 
-0.1327 
(0.1137) 
-0.3511 
(0.0484) 1.38 
Age2/100 1.3350 (0.8122) 
2.8694 
(0.4692) -3.27 
1.3350 
(0.8122) 
2.8694 
(0.4692) -1.19 
Education 0.1403 (0.0764) 
0.1338 
(0.0563) 0.12 
0.1403 
(0.0764) 
0.1338 
(0.0563) 0.28 
High school 
diploma 
-0.0762 
(0.3236) 
-0.3263 
(0.2981) 0.84 
-0.0762 
(0.3236) 
-0.3263 
(0.2981) 0.15 
College 
diploma 
0.6676 
(0.2308) 
0.9465 
(0.2761) -1.01 
0.6676 
(0.2308) 
0.9465 
(0.2761) -1.04 
Professional 
experience 
0.0865 
(0.1731) 
0.0444 
(0.1797) 0.23 
0.0865 
(0.1731) 
0.0444 
(0.1797) 0.08 
Managerial 
experience 
0.0223 
(0.0903) 
0.0827 
(0.1555) -0.39 
0.0223 
(0.0903) 
0.0827 
(0.1555) -0.40 
Sales 
experience 
0.1072 
(0.1016) 
0.0814 
(0.1502) 0.17 
0.1072 
(0.1016) 
0.0814 
(0.1502) 0.34 
Clerical 
experience 
-0.0090 
(0.1083) 
0.0779 
(0.1501) -0.58 
-0.0090 
(0.1083) 
0.0779 
(0.1501) -0.53 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.1471 
(0.0948) 
0.3264 
(0.1370) -1.31 
0.1471 
(0.0948) 
0.3264 
(0.1370) -0.70 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0325 
(0.0869) 
0.1358 
(0.1214) -0.85 
0.0325 
(0.0869) 
0.1358 
(0.1214) -1.20 
Laborer 
experience 
-0.0951 
(0.1618) 
0.0596 
(0.1700) -0.91 
-0.0951 
(0.1618) 
0.0596 
(0.1700) -0.87 
Service 
experience 
-0.3775 
(0.0972) 
-0.4288 
(0.1928) 0.27 
-0.3775 
(0.0972) 
-0.4288 
(0.1928) -0.25 
Previously a 
professional 
1.312 
(0.476) 
1.934 
(0.599) -1.04 
1.312 
(0.476) 
0.1.934 
(0.0599) -1.11 
Previously a 
manager 
1.837 
(0.393) 
2.194 
(0.735) -0.49 
1.837 
(0.393) 
2.194 
(0.735) -0.85 
Previously 
sales 
3.262 
(0.411) 
2.869 
(0.544) 0.72 
3.262 
(0.411) 
2.869 
(0.544) 0.48 
Previously 
clerical 
2.005 
(0.388) 
1.864 
(0.0427) 0.33 
2.005 
(0.388) 
1.864 
(0.427) -0.73 
Previously a 
craftsman 
1.358 
(0.407) 
1.778 
(0.573) -0.73 
1.358 
(0.407) 
1.778 
(0.573) -0.72 
Previously an 
operative 
1.272 
(0.361) 
1.049 
(0.457) 0.49 
1.272 
(0.361) 
1.049 
(0.457) 0.37 
Previously a 
laborer 
1.358 
(0.457) 
1.015 
(0.545) 0.63 
1.358 
(0.457) 
1.015 
(0.545) 0.65 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Normalized difference = [β(ignore class. error)- β(correct for class. 
error)]/[Standard error of β(correct for class. error)]. 
 
Table 4 Panel B: Parameter Estimates – Non-pecuniary Utility 
 
 Craftsmen  Normalized 
difference 
Operatives  Normalized 
difference 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age -0.1896 (0.0717) 
-0.2998 
(0.0799) 1.82 
-0.1519 
(0.0551) 
-0.2535 
(0.0558) 1.87 
Age2/100 1.1693 (0.5598) 
1.8996 
(0.6139) -1.43 
1.3557 
(0.4459) 
2.0207 
(0.4634) -1.51 
Education 0.1443 (0.0638) 
0.1253 
(0.0678) 0.40 
-0.0703 
(0.0479) 
-0.0873 
(0.0422) 0.36 
High school 
diploma 
0.2760 
(0.2437) 
0.2466 
(0.1995) 0.02 
0.1959 
(0.1839) 
0.1931 
(0.1680) -0.09 
College 
diploma 
0.5009 
(0.2163) 
0.7951 
(0.2838) -0.16 
-0.4700 
(0.2633) 
-0.4137 
(0.3614) -0.05 
Professional 
experience 
0.1874 
(0.1529) 
0.1779 
(0.1211) -0.08 
0.1858 
(0.1581) 
0.1962 
(0.1387) 0.79 
Managerial 
experience 
0.0188 
(0.0762) 
0.0697 
(0.1283) -0.45 
-0.1568 
(0.0753) 
-0.0980 
(0.1321) 0.00 
Sales 
experience 
-0.1264 
(0.1093) 
-0.1851 
(0.1752) 0.54 
-0.2418 
(0.1272) 
-0.3401 
(0.1816) -0.14 
Clerical 
experience 
0.3591 
(0.0857) 
0.4253 
(0.1258) -0.32 
-0.1887 
(0.0887) 
-0.1428 
(0.1439) -0.46 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.1197 
(0.0637) 
0.2104 
(0.1293) -0.86 
0.3067 
(0.0520) 
0.4074 
(0.1172) -0.64 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0786 
(0.0707) 
0.2151 
(0.1136) -1.24 
0.0571 
(0.0552) 
0.1824 
(0.1010) -1.36 
Laborer 
experience 
0.0089 
(0.1066) 
0.1485 
(0.1601) -1.35 
0.0430 
(0.0848) 
0.2381 
(0.1449) -1.30 
Service 
experience 
-0.3782 
(0.0623) 
-0.3587 
(0.0787) 0.74 
-0.4665 
(0.0448) 
-0.5178 
(0.0697) 0.41 
Previously a 
professional 
1.338 
(0.380) 
1.866 
(0.478) -0.40 
0.1124 
(0.0394) 
1.337 
(0.526) -0.84 
Previously a 
manager 
1.477 
(0.325) 
2.034 
(0.653) -0.90 
0.1527 
(0.0312) 
2.115 
(0.651) -0.55 
Previously 
sales 
1.710 
(0.457) 
1.415 
(0.618) 0.66 
0.1413 
(0.0489) 
1.059 
(0.536) 0.52 
Previously 
clerical 
2.804 
(0.301) 
2.874 
(0.097) 0.10 
0.1198 
(0.0333) 
1.166 
(0.324) -0.07 
Previously a 
craftsman 
1.105 
(0.307) 
1.462 
(0.492) -1.26 
0.2903 
(0.0195) 
3.368 
(0.368) -1.02 
Previously an 
operative 
0.763 
(0.280) 
0.609 
(0.416) 0.36 
0.1521 
(0.0195) 
1.415 
(0.294) 0.42 
Previously a 
laborer 
1.672 
(0.286) 
1.411 
(0.399) 0.98 
0.1636 
(0.0231) 
1.312 
(0.329) 1.06 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Normalized difference = [β(ignore class. error)- β(correct for class. 
error)]/[Standard error of β(correct for class. error)]. 
 
Table 4 Panel B: Parameter Estimates – Non-pecuniary Utility 
 
 Laborers  Normalized 
difference 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age -0.2017 (0.0634) 
-0.3403 
(0.0650) 2.13 
Age2/100 1.8105 (0.5104) 
2.7642 
(0.5240) -1.82 
Education -0.1514 (0.0613) 
-0.1099 
(0.0545) -0.76 
High school diploma 0.2912 (0.2274) 
0.1422 
(0.2124) 0.70 
College diploma 0.0821 (0.3341) 
0.3030 
(0.3584) -0.62 
Professional 
experience 
-0.4791 
(0.2656) 
-0.3477 
(0.4226) -0.31 
Managerial 
experience 
-0.2364 
(0.1162) 
-0.3256 
(0.1955) 0.46 
Sales 
experience 
-0.2337 
(0.1279) 
-0.2623 
(0.1937) 0.15 
Clerical 
experience 
0.0255 
(0.0883) 
0.0713 
(0.1468) -0.31 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.0943 
(0.0594) 
0.1882 
(0.1207) -0.78 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0370 
(0.0575) 
0.1673 
(0.1032) -1.26 
Laborer 
experience 
0.3250 
(0.0910) 
0.4753 
(0.1501) -1.00 
Service 
experience 
-0.4093 
(0.0654) 
-0.4625 
(0.0884) 0.60 
Previously a 
professional 
0.943 
(0.484) 
0.175 
(0.695) -0.33 
Previously a manager 0.609 (0.400) 
0.129 
(0.776) -0.67 
Previously sales 0.604 (0.699) 
0.754 
(0.707) -0.21 
Previously clerical 1.310 (0.354) 
1.322 
(0.351) -0.04 
Previously a craftsman 1.525 (0.240) 
1.832 
(0.435) -0.70 
Previously an 
operative 
1.139 
(0.204) 
0.976 
(0.311) 0.53 
Previously a laborer 1.870 (0.213) 
1.579 
(0.331) 0.88 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Normalized difference = [β(ignore class. error)- β(correct for class. 
error)]/[Standard error of β(correct for class. error)]. 
 
 
Table 4 Panel C: Parameter Estimates – Unobserved Heterogeneity: Classification Error Model 
 
 Type 1  Type 2  Type 3  
Non-pecuniary intercepts Parameter Std. error Parameter Std. error Parameter Std. error 
Professional  -4.7210 0.3270 -4.1600 0.2920 -2.8250 0.3810 
Managers  -3.1880 0.0930 -3.0920 0.1770 -2.2050 0.2510 
Sales  -6.1960 0.4940 -0.9120 0.3780 0.0160 0.3850 
Clerical  -1.7920 0.3340 -1.7200 0.3460 -0.5640 0.3520 
Craftsmen  -0.1250 0.2410 -0.0660 0.2260 0.5370 0.3130 
Operatives 0.0310 0.2470 0.0570 0.2310 0.6560 0.3100 
Laborers 0.3220 0.2590 0.4030 0.2180 1.2000 0.3180 
Wage intercepts       
Professional  1.9360 0.0220 1.1810 0.0250 1.6380 0.0220 
Managers  1.4510 0.0350 1.0740 0.0260 1.5990 0.0360 
Sales  2.3700 0.2600 -0.2990 0.1770 0.2740 0.1850 
Clerical  1.4400 0.0380 1.1220 0.0450 1.5480 0.0300 
Craftsmen  1.6460 0.0260 1.3670 0.0250 1.9630 0.0300 
Operatives 1.6220 0.0240 1.3810 0.0230 1.9710 0.0260 
Laborers 1.4130 0.0480 1.3000 0.0470 1.7150 0.0420 
Service  1.5020 0.0310 1.0620 0.0240 0.0010 0.1240 
Type probabilities       
Pr(Type 1) 0.1216 .032     
Pr(Type 2) 0.3675 .041     
Pr(Type 3)     .5109 .042     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Panel C: Parameter Estimates – Unobserved Heterogeneity: Model that Ignores 
Classification Error 
 
 Type 1  Type 2  Type 3  
Non-pecuniary intercepts Parameter Std. error Parameter Std. error Parameter Std. error 
Professional  -3.6890 0.3330 -3.4730 0.3160 -2.1610 0.3520 
Managers  -2.4600 0.3300 -2.5340 0.3060 -1.5880 0.3640 
Sales  -7.2570 0.7340 -2.0600 0.4340 -1.0310 0.4350 
Clerical  -1.8030 0.2820 -2.0260 0.2860 -0.9600 0.3590 
Craftsmen  -0.1680 0.2170 -0.3450 0.2110 0.5080 0.2910 
Operatives -0.1820 0.2210 -0.1820 0.2180 0.5370 0.2930 
Laborers -0.0110 0.2560 -0.0090 0.2420 0.6280 0.3030 
Wage intercepts 
      
Professional  1.7720 0.0630 1.0550 0.0610 1.5460 0.0600 
Managers  1.3740 0.0750 0.9420 0.0720 1.4420 0.0720 
Sales  1.8580 0.1800 -0.0220 0.1420 0.4980 0.1390 
Clerical  1.4640 0.0470 1.1000 0.0510 1.5630 0.0490 
Craftsmen  1.5540 0.0320 1.2910 0.0300 1.8530 0.0340 
Operatives 1.5590 0.0380 1.3020 0.0360 1.7940 0.0360 
Laborers 1.4670 0.0570 1.2880 0.0550 1.7770 0.0600 
Service  1.4630 0.0520 1.0170 0.0480 1.3190 0.0690 
Type probabilities       
Pr(Type 1) 0.0456 .033     
Pr(Type 2) 0.5030 .039     
Pr(Type 3) .4514 .040     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Panel C: Average Wage & Non-pecuniary Intercepts Across Types 
 
Average non-pecuniary 
intercepts (φ’s) 
Ignore classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification error 
Professional  -2.890 -3.546 
Managers  -2.103 -2.650 
Sales  -1.832 -1.080 
Clerical  -1.534 -1.138 
Craftsmen  0.048 0.234 
Operatives 0.142 0.359 
Laborers 0.278 0.800 
Average wage intercepts (μ’s) 
  
Professional  1.309 1.506 
Managers  1.187 1.388 
Sales  0.298 0.318 
Clerical  1.325 1.378 
Craftsmen  1.556 1.705 
Operatives 1.535 1.711 
Laborers 1.516 1.525 
Service  1.173 0.5734 
            Note: Averages computed across types. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Completed Education by Observed Occupation for Correctly Classified and Misclassified 
Occupational Choices 
 
Observed Occupation in NLSY 
Data 
 % No College 
Completed 
% College 
Graduate 
Professional  Correctly classified Misclassified 
10.8% 
48.6% 
71.8% 
30.2% 
Managers  Correctly classified Misclassified 
39.8% 
47.2% 
36.8% 
28.7% 
Sales  Correctly classified Misclassified 
25.2% 
44.8% 
54.2% 
24.7% 
Clerical  Correctly classified Misclassified 
54.9% 
36.0% 
23.7% 
49.0% 
Craftsmen  Correctly classified Misclassified 
77.9% 
53.3% 
2.1% 
18.7% 
Operatives Correctly classified Misclassified 
85.2% 
61.3% 
2.5% 
21.5% 
Laborers Correctly classified Misclassified 
83.7% 
73.0% 
3.2% 
11.7% 
Service  Correctly classified Misclassified 
60.2% 
74.2% 
13.7% 
8.1% 
Notes: Generated using the simulated data that identifies occupational choices as correctly or incorrectly classified. The 
“correctly classified” row refers to observations where the occupation in the leftmost column matches the true occupation 
code generated by the model. The “misclassified” row refers to observations where a person is observed in the occupation in 
the leftmost column and the simulated true occupation differs from the observed occupation. So, 71.8% of correctly classified 
professionals graduated from college, while only 30.2% of those incorrectly classified as professionals graduated from 
college. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Distribution of Total Number of Times a Person’s Occupational Choices are 
Misclassified Over the Career and Length of Misclassification Spells 
 
Total # of Times 
Misclassified 
Percentage # of Consecutive Times 
Misclassified 
Percentage 
0 57.2% 1 72.9% 
1 17.6% 2 18.3% 
2 11.5% 3 5.2% 
3 6.3% 4 1.8% 
4 3.0% 5 .7% 
5 2.2% >5 .93% 
6-9 1.9%   
>9 .20%   
 Entries are the distributions of the number of times that a person’s occupational choices are misclassified over 
the course of the career and lengths misclassification spells based on the simulated data.  
 
 
 
Table 7: Average True Choice Probabilities by Observed Choice and Wage Percentile 
 
Observed/Actual  Professional Managers Sales Clerical Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service 
Professional  
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.909 
.953 
.757 
.000 
.001 
.001 
.074 
.006 
.053 
.000 
.000 
.001 
.000 
.013 
.020 
.000 
.000 
.001 
.004 
.012 
.070 
.011 
.014 
.095 
Managers  
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.052 
.020 
.010 
.565 
.858 
.544 
.374 
.067 
.272 
.001 
.002 
.004 
.002 
.003 
.004 
.000 
.002 
.005 
.000 
.001 
.012 
.005 
.046 
.148 
Sales  
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.039 
.033 
.004 
.033 
.018 
.005 
.916 
.911 
.834 
.017 
.000 
.016 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.002 
.007 
.000 
.002 
.007 
.038 
.026 
.127 
Clerical  
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.039 
.033 
.004 
.005 
.017 
.005 
.916 
.911 
.834 
.001 
.008 
.016 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.002 
.007 
.000 
.002 
.007 
.038 
.026 
.127 
Craftsmen  
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.031 
.008 
.005 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.091 
.015 
.124 
.000 
.000 
.003 
.872 
.965 
.818 
.000 
.002 
.005 
.003 
.007 
.041 
.000 
.000 
.002 
Operatives 
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.084 
.009 
.003 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.110 
.008 
.119 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.801 
.979 
     .869 
.003 
.003 
.006 
.000 
.000 
.000 
Laborers 
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.065 
.003 
.071 
.012 
.007 
.004 
.032 
.008 
.003 
.002 
.003 
.002 
.885 
.976 
.915 
.003 
.001 
.004 
Service  
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.054 
.005 
.000 
.004 
.001 
.000 
.072 
.001 
.100 
.000 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.150 
.251 
.174 
.719 
.732 
.725 
 Note: Entries are the average true choice probabilities found in the simulated data conditional on the observed choice and wage. Top, middle, and 
bottom 10% refer to the location of the observed wage in the wage distribution of the observed occupation.
Appendix A: Data
The goal of this paper is to follow workers from the time they make a permanent transition
to the labor market and start their career. There is no clear best way to identify this transition
to the labor market, so this analysis follows people from the month they reach age 18 or stop
attending school, whichever occurs later. Individuals are followed until they reach age 35, or exit
from the sample due to missing data. There are 6,111 men in the nationally representative cross
sectional sample of the NLSY. Of these workers, there are 2,439 white males who are candidates
to be used in this analysis. As noted in the text, respondents are between the ages of 14 and
21 in the rst year of the NLSY. One issue raised by the fact that respondents enter the sample
at di¤erent ages is that there is an initial conditions problem for the older workers because the
data does not contain any information on their work history before they enter the sample. For
example, if someone enters the sample at age 21 they may have never worked before, or they
could have accumulated a number of years of experience in a particular occupation.
Based on these considerations, individuals who enter the NLSY sample at an age older than
18 are dropped from the sample, so that each individual enters the sample at the start of his
career. Since individuals are nearly evenly distributed across initial ages, approximately 43% of
the sample is dropped as a result of the age restriction. In addition, individuals are dropped
if they serve in the military at some point during their career, if they ever work as farmers, if
they report being self employed, if it is not possible to determine when they stopped attending
school and started their career, or if information on completed schooling is missing. Finally,
observations are truncated if geographic data, wage data, or occupation data are missing, or
if the individual exits from the sample. The nal sample contains 954 individuals and 10,573
observations.
Since the estimation sample is considerable smaller that the entire NLSY sample due to the
age restriction, one might wonder how this sample compares to a broader sample from the NLSY.
Table 1b shows descriptive statistics for the estimation sample and a broader sample of white
men from the NLSY cross sectional sample that includes roughly twice as many individuals
because it includes individuals who enter the NLSY sample at ages older than 18. Overall, the
samples appear to be quite similar in terms of observable characteristics. As an additional check,
equation number 20 shows the estimates of a simple regression of wages on age, education, and
occupation dummy variables for the estimation sub-sample, and equation number 21 shows the
estimates based on the broader sample (standard errors in parentheses),
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ln(w) = 1:16 + :035age+ :054educ  :062manag   :129sales (20)
(.034) (.001) (.003) (.018) (.023)
 :173cleric  :046craft  :175oper   :222labor   :331serv
(.021) (.017) (.018) (.021) (.020)
ln(w) = :829 + :026age+ :062educ  :039manag   :097sales (21)
(.035) (.001) (.002) (.014) (.016)
 :190cleric  :037craft  :142oper   :220labor   :360serv:
(.016) (.013) (.013) (.015) (.015)
Appendix B: Simulating the Likelihood Function
B1: The Likelihood Function
Let dExpiqt represent person is true experience in occupation q in time period t. Dene dExpit
as a Q  1 vector of experience in each occupation. Let dLastoccit represent a Q  1 vector of
dummy variables where the qth element is equal to 1 if person is true occupational choice was q
in time period t 1. Let Fit( dExpit; dLastoccit) represent the distribution of true occupation specic
experience and lagged occupational choices for person i in time period t. This distribution is
a function of each persons observed characteristics, and observed choices and wages, but these
conditioning variables are suppressed for brevity of notation. The likelihood function can be
evaluated by integrating over the distribution of the unobserved state variables,
L() =
NY
i=1
Z T (i)Y
t=1
Lit(jdExpit; dLastoccit)dFit(dExpit; dLastoccit): (22)
However, in practice this is very di¢ cult to do because the distribution Fit( dExpit; dLastoccit)
is intractably complex. This problem can be overcome by simulated the likelihood function
using a recursive simulation algorithm that is similar to the Geweke (1991), Hajivassiliou (1990),
and Keane (1994) (GHK) algorithm. The GHK algorithm breaks a choice probability up into
a sequence of transition probabilities, and then recursively simulates the sequence. Simulation
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methods have not been used extensively in this manner to solve problems created by measurement
error, although it is a natural application of these techniques.
B2: The Simulation Algorithm
This section provides the details of the simulation algorithm used to evaluate the likelihood
function. For simplicity, the algorithm is outlined for the case where the number of unobserved
heterogeneity types (M) equals one because the extension to multiple types is straightforward.
The object that must be simulated is
L() =
NY
i=1
Z T (i)Y
t=1
QX
q=1
1fOit = qgPit(q; wobsit j; Zit;Xit;dExpit; dLastoccit)dF (dExpit; dLastoccit)
=
NY
i=1
Z T (i)Y
t=1
Lit(Oit; w
obs
it j; Zit;Xit;dExpit; dLastoccit)dF (dExpit; dLastoccit) (23)
Let variables with a  superscript represent simulated variables, and let r = 1; :::; R in-
dex simulation draws. Using this notation, Oit(rj; Oit; wobsit ; Zit;Xit; Expit; Lastoccit) is a sim-
ulated occupational choice, Expit+1(rj;Oit; wobsit ; Zit;Xit; Expit; Lastoccit) is a Q  1 vector of
simulated occupation specic experience, Lastoccit+1(rj; Oit; wobsit ; Zit;Xit; Expit; Lastoccit) is a
vector of dummy variables representing the simulated occupational choice in the previous pe-
riod, and Lit(r; Oit; w
obs
it j; Zit;Xit; Expit; Lastoccit) is a simulated likelihood contribution. For
brevity of notation, dene the set of conditioning variables for the simulated choices as  =
f; Oit; wobsit ; Zit;Xit; Expit; Lastoccitg. The simulation algorithm for person i is:
1. Start in time period t = 1, simulation draw r = 1. All experience variables equal zero at
the start of the career by denition, so initialize the simulated experience vector to zero
for time periods t = 1; :::; T .
2. Evaluate and store the simulated likelihood contribution for year t, simulation draw r;
Lit(r; Oit; w
obs
it j; Zit;Xit; Expit(r); Lastoccit(r)):
3. Compute and store the probability that person is true choice in time period t ( bOit) is each of
the Q possible occupations, conditional on the parameter vector (), observed choice (Oit),
observed wage (wobsit ), explanatory variables (Zit;Xit), and simulated previous occupational
choice (Lastoccit(r)) and experience variables (Exp

it(r)). Let 
it(r; qj) for q = 1; :::; Q
represent the conditional probability for simulation draw r that the true occupational
choice is q for person i in time period t. These probabilities can be written using Bayes
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rule as

it(r; qj) = Pr( bOit = q j ) (24)
=
Oit;1
bPit(q; wobsit )PQ
k=1 Oit;k
bPit(k; wobsit ) : (25)
Recall that bPit() is a function of all of the variables that 
it() is conditioned on, but these
arguments are suppressed here. This implies that the conditional true choice probabilities
(
it()) are a function of the observed wage and all of the explanatory variables in the
model.
4. Use the Q computed conditional true choice probabilities, 
it(r; qj); to dene the discrete
distribution of true occupational choices fPr(Oit(r) = q) = 
it(r; qj)g; q = 1; :::; Qg: Next,
randomly draw a simulated true occupational choice Oit(rj) for person i at time period
t from the discrete distribution of the Q possible true occupational choices.
5. Use the simulated choice Oit(rj) to update the vectors of simulated experience and lagged
occupational choice vectors, Expit+1(r) and Lastocc

it+1(r): The updating rules are to in-
crease the element of the experience vector by one in the simulated occupation, and leave
all other elements of the vector unchanged. For the previous occupation dummy, set the
element of the Lastoccit+1(r) vector corresponding to the simulated occupation in time t
equal to one and set all other elements of the vector to zero.
6. If t = T (i) (the nal time period for person i); go to step 7. Otherwise, Set t = t + 1 and
go back to step 2.
7. Compute the likelihood function for simulated path r,
Lri () =
T (i)Y
t=1
Lit(r; Oit; w
obs
it j; Zit;Xit; Expit(r); Lastoccit(r)):
8. Repeat this algorithm R times, and the simulated likelihood function is the average of the
R path probabilities over the R draws,
Li () =
1
R
RX
r=1
Lri ():
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During estimation, antithetic acceleration is used to reduce the variance of the simulated
integrals. The number of simulation draws is set at R = 60. Increasing the number of simulation
draws to R = 600 leads to only a :01% change in the value of the likelihood function at the
simulated maximum likelihood parameter estimates.17
17As a further check on the robustness of the parameter estimates to the choice of R, the model was re-estimated
using R = 30_0. The program converged to essentially the same parameter vector as it did when R = 60 was used.
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